











Per Adman och Per Strömblad 
 
Utopia becoming dystopia? 
Analyzing political trust among  


















 ___________________________________________________________________  
Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier 2011:10 
ISSN: 1652-120X 
ISBN: 978-91-85619-88-7 Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
Arbetsrapport/Working Paper 2011:10 
 
 
– 2 – 
   
   Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
Arbetsrapport/Working Paper 2011:10 
 
 
– 3 – 

















Utopia becoming dystopia?  
Analyzing political trust among  

















Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier, 2011:10 
Working Paper/Institute for Futures Studies, 2011:10 
 
Stockholm 2011 Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
Arbetsrapport/Working Paper 2011:10 
 
 
– 4 – 
   
 
 
Per Adman  











Denna studie handlar om hur förtroendet för offentliga institutioner och myndigheter varierar 
bland olika grupper av invandrade i Sverige. Vi analyserar data från en storskalig intervjuunder-
sökning i syfte att jämföra betydelsen av erfarenheter från olika politiska system. Därigenom 
försöker vi dra slutsatser om hur skillnader i anspråk och förväntningar kan påverka institution-
ellt förtroende. Studien visar att personer som invandrat från länder med utbredd korruption har 
en ljusare syn på de offentliga institutionerna i Sverige – detta i jämförelse såväl med invand-
rade från mindre korrupta länder, som med infödda svenskar. Våra resultat tyder således på att 
förtroendet för svenska politiska institutioner och myndigheter påverkas positivt av erfarenheter 
från sämre fungerande och mindre rättssäkra politiska system. Men studien visar också att ett 
initialt högt förtroende tenderar att plana ut i takt med den tid som en invandrad person har till-
bringat i Sverige. Vi undersöker om denna gradvis minskande tilltro kan förklaras av erfaren-




This paper aims to increase our knowledge on the political trust of immigrants’ in established 
democracies. Utilising Swedish survey data, based on a large oversample of respondents with a 
foreign background, we show that immigrants from countries more plagued by corruption place 
significantly higher trust in political institutions in Sweden in comparison with both immigrants 
from more auspicious institutional settings and with the native population. However, we also 
find that an initially bright view of the Swedish institutional qualities tend to attenuate over 
time, as immigrants from countries of high corruption develop more critical viewpoints. In con-
trast to reasonable expectations, we nonetheless find that this decrease in trust is not explained 
by experiences of discrimination. Overall, the hypotheses elaborated and tested in this paper 
may be regarded as a more general contribution to a theory on how political trust is related to 
experiences and expectations of political institutions.  
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Introduction 
For some time, political trust—the overall confidence in the political institutions of a given poli-
ty —seems to have declined in most Western democracies (Klingemann, 1999, pp.49–52; 
Holmberg, 1999; Dalton, 1999, pp.66–69; Levi and Stoker, 2000, p.482; Dalton, 2006). Still, 
there may be considerable intra-country variations in political trust that deserve further exami-
nation. In this paper, we investigate differences in political trust among immigrants facing the 
comparatively well-functioning democratic and administrative institutions of Sweden. As these 
immigrants come from virtually all parts of the world, we hypothesise that they may have high-
ly diverse expectations of the Swedish political system. In support of this line of thought, we 
find that the variation in expected system performance is consequential.  
 
Why, then, should we care about political trust about in the first place? It is hardly controversial 
to argue that citizens' confidence in political institutions and politicians is an important issue in 
each democratic society. In its absence, the entire political system may be viewed as both unre-
liable and inefficient, in the end eroding legitimacy (e.g. Rahn and Rudolph, 2005, pp.530–531). 
Therefore, it is crucial to understand what causes this confidence to prosper and what causes it 
to decline. Knowledge on this particular matter is however surprisingly scarce. Socio-economic 
status, habitually proven to be highly important for political participation as well as for political 
interest and efficacy, seems to have, at best, modest explanatory power in this regard.  True, po-
litical trust seems to be positively correlated with some attitudes captured in standard survey 
items, such as satisfaction with democracy and party identification (Holmberg 1999; Newton 
1999). But there are good reasons to further explore the importance of subjective assessments of 
“system performance” (Easton, 1965; cf. Anderson and Tverdova, 2003).  
 
One may assume that individual experiences of government activities influence evaluations of 
both elected politicians and of more or less abstract institutions of the bureaucracy (Kumlin and 
Rothstein, 2005). Aside from this individuals are also likely to make more implicit assessments 
of political institutions, being guided for instance by various impressions of other peoples' expe-
riences and by mass media case reports. In this paper, we develop a theory based on the assump-
tion that, depending on their background and expectations, people may in fact use different 
yardsticks when they evaluate political institutions. If this is correct, some members of a given 
polity may very well have strong political trust, while others are deeply critical of the same po-
litical institutions. In relation to this, it naturally becomes an important question what kind of 
system performance that in fact should be measured. While macroeconomic indicators are re-Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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currently analyzed in previous research, the effects of “real” political performance have rarely 
been recognized (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003, p.92). This, we argue, provides room for fur-
ther empirical investigation as well as for theory development.  
 
In what follows, we show that immigrants from countries more plagued by corruption tend to 
place higher trust in Swedish political institutions. However, we also demonstrate that such, ini-
tially bright, views tend to attenuate over time. The length of residence seems to be negatively 
associated with political trust. In trying to explain this pattern, we test a discrimination hypothe-
sis according to which an optimistic point of view within certain groups of immigrants gradual-
ly will be replaced with a more critical outlook due to more frequent experiences of discrimina-
tion. As we conclude, however, that this hypothesis is not empirically supported, we tentatively 
also test another explanation, according to which former high-trusting immigrants are influ-
enced by perceptions of general, rather than immigrant specific, circumstances. Although data 
do not permit any firm conclusions in this respect, the alternative explanation seems fully com-
patible with our empirical findings.  
 
In the subsequent section, we position our study in relation to previous research. This is fol-
lowed by a section elaborating our theoretical position. Next, we present the data and measures 
used, followed by a section describing our empirical findings. In the final section, we conclude 
the study and discuss some implications for further research. 
 
Previous research 
The nature of political trust may clearly be regarded as multifaceted. Easton (1965) developed a 
classic trichotomy by distinguishing between support for the community, for the regime, and for 
the authorities in power. This distinction—although widely accepted as relevant—has been de-
veloped in more recent studies. For example, Norris (1999) argues that ‘regime’ category should 
be divided into the three categories of regime principles, regime performance, and regime insti-
tutions. Utilizing these further distinctions has proven fruitful. Several empirical studies have 
shown that citizens in general support regime principles, but often are much less trusting with 
regard to how the regime, including its institutions and actors, behaves in practice (e.g. Dalton, 
1999; Inglehart, 1999). It has also been discovered that different dimensions of trust may influ-
ence each other; e.g. it has been shown that trust in political institutions is positively associated 
with the degree of overall satisfaction with a given democratic system (Zmerli, Newton and 
Montero, 2007).  Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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A recurring result in the literature is that those who identify more strongly with the ruling party 
(or parties) show higher levels of political trust, and vice versa (Newton, 1999). Quite plausibly, 
this is related to individuals’ political preferences, as reflected in a certain level of support for 
incumbent politicians. Attachment to the local community also seems to have a positive effect 
(Zmerli, Newton and Montero, 2007). Socio-economic status, on the other hand, shows only 
minor explanatory power; the impact of factors such as education and income on the level of po-
litical trust seem to be, at best, modest (cf. Newton, 1999; Holmberg, 1999).
1 Thus, previous 
scholarly efforts notwithstanding, propositions on other factors potentially related to political 
trust seem highly warranted.  
 
It seems reasonable that a given individual’s level of political trust to some extent depends on 
the actual set of political institutions that she or he is confronting. Hence, assuming that (actual 
as well as perceived) performance of political institutions varies across countries, a focus also 
on contextual properties should be rewarding.  Exploring attitudes towards government from a 
cross-country perspective, Anderson and Tverdova (2003) present interesting evidence in this 
respect. They find country corruption level to be associated with more negative individual level 
evaluations of governmental practices (see also Mishler and Rose, 2001). Building upon their 
result we attempt to include not only current impressions of governmental performance, but also 
past experiences. To this end, a focus on immigrants is clearly relevant, as cross-country migra-
tion entails experiences from potentially different political systems. 
 
According to several studies, immigrants in Western Europe tend to be less active in political 
life than the native population (Bäck and Soininen, 1998; Adman and Strömblad, 2000; Fenne-
ma and Tillie, 2001; Togeby, 2004). Although recent findings suggest that the partition of di-
verse forms of political activism is decisive for the conclusions that may be drawn (Myrberg, 
2007), immigrants also tend to articulate a more negative view on perceived possibilities for po-
litical influence.
2 As for political trust, however, previous research is unexpectedly scarce.  
                                                 
1 Although not further addressed in this paper, scholarly findings indicate that there are important links 
between political and social trust. In a comparative study, Zmerli, Newton and Montero (2007) find social 
trust to be a strong predictor of political trust. It is worth noting that their conclusion opposes the results 
found in several earlier studies (e.g., Kaase, 1999, p.13). Further, Lolle and Torpe (2010) uncover strong 
relationships between confidence in political institutions and social trust in Denmark and Sweden. 
2 As for Sweden Myrberg (2007, p.103) has shown that immigrants score lower on measures of internal 
political efficacy (referring to a given citizen’s confidence in her/his own political competence), but not 
 Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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Intuitively, one may expect to find profound distrust, at least among immigrants from countries 
characterized by severe political repression. For immigrants with such a background, one may 
assume that previous negative evaluations of political institutions are ‘sticky’, and hence that 
their gut-level response when asked about political authorities and institutions should be quite 
pessimistic, or even deprecating. But a recent study by Maxwell (2010a) in fact rather demon-
strates the opposite. Maxwell shows that the levels of trust in parliament and satisfaction with 
national government are generally higher among immigrants than among native born citizens in 
Western Europe. Moreover, and particularly interesting in the light of our own hypotheses, 
Maxwell’s study also indicates that the country of origin status in terms of level of democracy is 
important for immigrants political trust. Contrary to derived expectations concerning ‘barriers to 
integration’ (Maxwell 2010a, p.38) immigrants from less democratic countries tend to express 
higher levels of political trust. 
 
However this positive effect should be explained, Maxwell’s study also shows that ‘second-
generation migrants’ (i.e. people having foreign born parents) generally express lower levels of 
political trust, more on par with the autochthonous population (i.e. with people having no mi-
grant background). In line with this finding, Michelson’s (2003) study on Mexican-Americans 
in the United States suggests that members of this group who have gained American citizenship 
tend to trust the government less than non-citizens. Michelson concluded that confidence de-
creases among many Mexican-Americans as they become more “acculturated” (in this case 
measured by language proficiency).  
 
A limitation of Michelson’s analysis is that it only included one specific category of immigrants 
in one specific setting. For several reasons, the situation of Mexican immigrants in the United 
States may not be readily transferable to a Western European context.  The study by Maxwell 
on the other hand includes 24 European countries, along with migrants within these countries 
from all parts of the world. Given this large scope, however, no particular attention was paid to 
the possible interaction between the time factor and experiences from other political systems. 
Precisely this is facilitated through the design of our own study. 
                                                                                                                                               
external political efficacy (referring to a given citizen’s overall confidence in politicians’ ability and will-
ingness to be responsive). Also, previous research has found no significant differences in political interest 
(Adman and Strömblad, 2000).  Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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Theory 
What would be the appropriate standard—or “benchmark”—if you ask someone to evaluate the 
trustworthiness of democratic institutions? The answer is likely to differ depending on who you 
ask. For persons who have spent their whole lives in a well-established democratic system, the 
standard would perhaps be something like “ideal democracy”. True, for most people the image 
of a theoretical ideal is probably quite abstract. Still, if the only available basis for evaluation is 
the “best of worlds”, one may very well anticipate a fairly critical view of the actual institutions, 
which after all hardly could be regarded as perfect in an absolute sense. Nevertheless, we as-
sume that citizens of long-time stable democracies in general do not believe that actual political 
institutions elsewhere are much more trustworthy. Following this line of thought, we assume 
that political trust would not change much for someone who migrates from a well-established 
democratic state to another, for example from the Netherlands to Sweden. It seems likely that 
such an individual, being accustomed to comparatively high standards regarding the quality of 
democratic government, roughly would expect the institutions of her or his new country to work 
equally well. Hence, the migrant in this case would neither be more worried, nor anticipate any 
great improvements in terms of how political representatives or government agencies perform 
their duties.  
 
On the other hand, the situation may vey well be significantly different for migrants from coun-
tries run by corrupt political regimes with poor, if any, democratic traditions. It may be reasona-
ble to assume that migrants sharing such a history develop an image of institutions working 
more or less perfectly from a democratic point of view, in established democracies like Sweden. 
Furthermore, in case of a deliberate choice of migration to a country like Sweden, hoping that 
life-circumstances there would improve significantly, this is also a “psychological investment” 
that probably would imply positive attitude towards Swedish institutions once the immigration 
process is completed (cf. Escobar, 2006; Maxwell, 2010a). Thus, in absence of previous experi-
ence of “good government”, migrants may consider reasonably well-functioning democratic 
countries to be much closer to the ideal in comparison with the country of origin. Therefore, 
when asked to judge political institutions in the new country, their comparative outlook is likely 
to result in evaluations that, all else being equal, are more positive than those observed either 
within the non-migrant population, or among immigrants from other stable democracies. Con-
sequently, and in line with Maxwell’s observations (2010a, p. 34) of immigrants’ political trust 
in Europe, we should expect high levels of political trust within large shares of the immigrant Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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population in countries like Sweden, as it is reasonable to assume that many non-Western im-
migrants perceive the political institutions in these countries as more reliable and trustworthy. In 
fact, along with a few other democracies, Sweden—the country that we focus on here—may be 
regarded as a “most likely” case for a positive outcome of comparative evaluations in this re-
gard. Sweden is habitually found to be among the “cleanest” in comprehensive comparisons of 




As indicated above, though, it is important to take time into consideration. Even if immigrants 
from countries of high corruption initially judge institutions in Sweden as very reliable and 
trustworthy, experiences and perceptions of how these institutions actually work may lead to a 
more negative view over time (cf. Michelson, 2003; Maxwell, 2010a). If this is the case, it is 
reasonable to expect that such a change in attitudes is related to experiences of discrimination, 
especially discrimination experienced during encounters with representatives of host country in-
stitutions (cf. Waters, 1999; Schierenbeck, 2004; Portes, Ferna´ndez-Kelly and Haller, 2005; 
Karlsson and Tahvilzadeh, 2010).  
 
We should be able to empirically evaluate these expectations by estimating the effect of past 
experiences, which we will capture by the overall level of corruption in the country of origin, on 
current political trust, simultaneously taking into account immigrants’ length of residence in the 
host country. 
 
From the reasoning above, we derive the following two hypotheses, for which we contend that 
international migration to Sweden has prepared a propitious test bed:  
 
H1: Immigrants from countries marked by high corruption initially trust political institutions in 
Sweden more than immigrants from other contexts, but this difference decreases with length of 
residence in Sweden.  
 
                                                 
3 In the Corruption Perception Index of 2008 (a measure which we we utilize in the empirical analyses of 
this paper) Sweden received, along with Denmark, the highest observed score of 9.3, on a scale ranging 
from 0 (‘highly corrupt’) to 10 (‘absolutely clean from corruption’).  Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
Arbetsrapport/Working Paper 2011:10 
 
 
– 11 – 
   
H2: Given H1, the decrease in political trust among immigrants from countries marked by high 
corruption is explained by experiences of discrimination in Sweden. 
 
Our hypotheses are supported, should we find that (A) corruption experience has a positive ef-
fect on political trust, (B) there is simultaneously a negative effect of the interaction between 
corruption experience and length of residence in Sweden, and (C) this interaction effect is ex-
plained by variations with respect to experiences of discrimination.  
 
Preparing for empirical scrutiny, we translate our theoretical scaffolding (with respect to H1), 
into the following analytical model: 
 
Political trust = f(Corruption experience, Time, Corruption experience × Time) 
 
In order to explain the assumed interaction effect (with respect to H2), we also fit the following, 
more complete, model: 
 
Political trust = f(Corruption experience, Time, Corruption experience × Time, Discrimi-
nation) 
 Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
Arbetsrapport/Working Paper 2011:10 
 
 
– 12 – 
   
Data and measures 
In the empirical analyses, we rely on the large-scale Swedish Citizen Survey 2003 (“Medborgar-
undersökningen 2003”). This survey employed face-to-face interviews with a stratified random 
sample of inhabitants in Sweden (age 18 and over). It consists of a large over-sample of immi-
grants (originally selected on the basis of official registry data). The total sample includes 2,138 
respondents of which 858 have immigrated to Sweden.
4 The Swedish Citizen Survey 2003 is 
particularly useful for the purpose of our study, while it, aside from including questions on con-
fidence in different political institutions in Sweden, also contains numerous questions on immi-
gration-specific experiences and life circumstances.  
 
Given that our hypotheses are based on the assumption that immigrants (more or less conscious-
ly) compare the performance of political systems, we chose to exclude persons who migrated 
during childhood from the analysis, as they hardly could have developed any well considered 
opinions about the political institutions in their country of origin. Hence, the empirical analysis 
is based only on respondents who had reached the age of 15 when they migrated to Sweden, as-
suming that persons of this age have had chances to form at least some experience based views 
of their (former) political system. The chosen cut point is of course somewhat arbitrary. How-
ever, we have also experimented with other restrictions (thus setting the “qualification” age of 
immigration above as well as below 15 years), but results tend to be very similar to those re-
ported below. 
 
Though following conventional approaches, we measure our dependent variable, political trust, 
quite comprehensively through each respondent’s stated confidence in no less than eight institu-
tions: the parliament, the courts, the police, politicians (explicitly expressed in this, very gen-
eral, sense), political parties (again, generally expressed), the municipal board (“kommun-
styrelsen”), the civil service, and the national government (“regeringen”).
5 All assessments were 
made using a scale from 0–10, where higher values represent more trust. We summarized re-
spondent answers in an additive index variable of overall political trust, which finally was re-
                                                 
4 The Swedish Citizen Survey 2003 employed a complex sampling scheme, increasing the selection prob-
ability for refugees and for immigrants from developing countries, while under-representing immigrants 
from Nordic and Western European countries. At the same time, the design allows for necessary adjust-
ments to produce representative samples of the total population, the native population and the population 
of immigrants, respectively.  
5 The political trust items were identically introduced, as follows: “I will now read out the names of various institu-
tions such as the police, the government, the civil service, etc. Please tell me how much confidence you have in each 
of these institutions”.  Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
Arbetsrapport/Working Paper 2011:10 
 
 
– 13 – 
   
scaled so that the minimum value on the dependent variable is 0 (for a respondent expressing 
minimum trust across all institutions) and the theoretical maximum is 1 (for a respondent ex-
pressing complete trust, no matter which institutional sphere).
6  
 
To evaluate the potential importance of experiences from other political systems, we utilize the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), developed by Transparency International (2008). Pub-
lished annually since 1995, this index is widely regarded as the most ambitious and reliable 
source of information on worldwide differences in corruption (Anderson and Tverdova, 2005, 
pp.95–96; cf. Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). We take advantage of this measure by matching 
CPI data for all countries of origin mentioned by the immigrated respondents in the Swedish 
Citizen Survey 2003. Thus, for each person in our data having a background in another country, 
the information is completed with a contextual measure on the corruption level of the country in 
question.
7 The CPI is originally expressed on a continuous 0–10 scale, where higher values in-
dicate less corruption. To facilitate interpretation in this study, however, we reversed the meas-
ure, thus letting the CPI range from lowest perceived corruption level to highest perceived cor-
ruption level (i.e. from “good to “bad”). Additionally, we recode the reversed 0–10 index to a 
(still continuous) 0–1 variable, analogous to the scale of our political trust variable. 
 
Discrimination is coded 1 for respondents who reported that they (“during the past 12 months”) 
had been badly treated because of their foreign background, and 0 for those who did not report 
any such experiences of discrimination. This question was specified by explicit reference to 
each of the following contexts and situations: when looking for a dwelling; in other housing-
related contacts; when looking for work; in other work-related contacts; in contacts regarding 
                                                 
6 The construction of the political trust index is supported by dimensional analyses. A principal compo-
nent analysis reveals that only one factor survives the Kaiser criterion (i.e., has an Eigenvalue greater than 
1.0). The single retained factor explains 61 percent of the variance in the eight variables, with an Eigen-
value of 4.9. Furthermore, we have replicated all analyses treating each of the eight measures of political 
trust as separate dependent variables. The results (not shown) generally tend to be very similar to those 
shown in table 1 and 2 below, although coefficients are not statistically significant in each single case.  
7 We used the 2008 CPI scores (which, at time of analysis, constituted the most recent figures) although 
ideally, the scores should be “time matched” as well. That is, in the best case scenario, we should be able 
to include the CPI score for Country A at the time when the respondent actually migrated from A. How-
ever, due to data shortage (CPI is a rather novel index) this is not possible. To the benefit of the study, it 
should be mentioned that the world wide pattern of corruption levels tend to be very similar across evalu-
ations over time. For instance, we found the rank correlation to be a respectable 0.95 between the CPI 
evaluations from 1996 and 2008 (using all 54 countries included in both surveys). Thus, the measure we 
use may still be regarded as a reasonable proxy, at least tapping present and past relative variations in 
country corruption levels.  Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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studies; in contacts regarding medical services; in contacts as a parent of a school child; in con-
tacts with other public authorities (e.g., the tax office, the social security office, or the police); 
when visiting a restaurant, dancehall or a sports event; when buying or hiring something as a 
private customer; during encounters in the street or in public transport; in contacts within anoth-
er context than those mentioned. 
 
We also add a set of basic control variables to the statistical models: Female is coded 1 for 
women and 0 for men; Age is the respondent’s age at the year of the interview; and Education 
measures the number of years spent in combined full-time schooling and occupational training 
(the measure refers to education accomplished outside of Sweden, since we primarily wanted to 




In a series of regression analyses, we carry out systematic tests of our hypotheses. Table 1 
summarizes the main results with respect to H1. In this table, Model 1 considers the pure addi-
tive effects of previous corruption experiences, taking into account only the set of control varia-
bles. In support of our first hypothesis, the statistically significant and positive regression coef-
ficient of the CPI variable suggests that immigrants from more corruption plagued countries 
tend to score higher on the political trust index. That is, they generally tend to have more confi-
dence in Swedish political institutions, taking into account demographic and educational differ-
ences. In substantial terms, the analysis suggests that the effect translates into a maximum dif-
ference of about 10  percentage points higher political trust. Thus, all else being equal, an immi-
grant from a country with high corruption is expected to trust the political institutions signifi-
cantly more than an immigrant with a background in a country on a par with Sweden in terms of 
corruption level. Although age seems to make a slight difference, the control factors overall 
proved to be virtually unimportant (in fact excluding them all, the CPI coefficient would still 
remain approximately the same). 
 
                                                 
8 We have replicated all analyses using an alternative measure on education, capturing the total number of 
years in schooling regardless of whether it tool place in Sweden or in another country. The results (not 
shown) are very similar to those shown in table 1 and 2 below. Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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Table 1. Predicting political trust by corruption experience (CPI) and years in Sweden, control-
ling for other explanatory factors (OLS regression)  
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4   
           



























































































           
   R
2  0.049  0.066  0.075  0.099   
   N (weighted cases)  516  516  516  516   
 
Statistical significance:  *** p < 0.01   ** p < 0.05  * p <  0.10 
 
Note: Entries are un-standardized regression coefficients (ordinary least-squares estimates) with standard 
errors in parentheses. The sample is weighted to be representative of foreign born people living in Swe-
den. The analyses only include those who were 15 years or older upon immigrating to Sweden. The de-
pendent variable political trust is a continuous scale running from 0 (very low trust) to 1 (very high trust). 
CPI is the Corruptions Perceptions Index, rescaled to run from 0 (very low levels of corruption) to 1 (very 
high levels of corruption). See the main text for a description, including information on coding, of the 
other independent variables. See appendix for descriptive statistics. 
 
 
Primarily for the sake of transparency, we include the important time factor in two separate 
steps. Model 2 is expanded with the measure on length of residence in Sweden, but disregarding 
possible interaction effects. The number of years since immigration at first seems to be associat-Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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ed with decreasing trust as this variable shows a statistically significant and negative effect. 
Moreover, including the time factor reduces the corruption experience effect to about half of its 
size leaving it statistically insignificant; a result suggesting that immigrants from countries with 
high corruption tend to have spent a shorter period of time in Sweden.
9 Yet, although mean 
length of residence differs among immigrants from different parts of the world, the estimation 
of Model 3 elicits a more complete picture. This analysis also considers the interaction effect 
between corruption experience and length of residence, whereby the positive effect of corrup-
tion experience on political trust is strongest among recently arrived immigrants.
10 And continu-
ing the support of H1, the result suggests that the positive effect of corruption experiences de-
creases with number of years spent in Sweden (as we find a significant negative interaction ef-
fect).  
 
   
                                                 
9 This is also confirmed by an analysis with years in Sweden as the dependent variable. Controlling for 
gender, age, and education, there is a statistically significant negative effect of CPI on years spent in 
Sweden. 
10 At the same time, one should note that the pure additive time effect becomes insignificant once the in-
teraction is accounted for. Hence, in line with our theoretical reasoning length of residence does not affect 
political trust among immigrants from countries with very low levels of corruption.  Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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Figure 1. Graph illustrating the interaction effect of years in Sweden and level of corruption in the coun-
try of origin on political trust (0–1). Regression-based predicted levels are based on a hypothetical male 
immigrant from either a high corruption (CPI = 0.9) or a low corruption (CPI = 0.1) country, (all control 
variables, aside from gender, are set to their means). The mean level of political trust among native 







The results in model 3 are further illustrated by Figure 1, displaying predicted levels of political 
trust given the length of residence in Sweden, and taking into account that immigrants from dif-
ferent countries are not equally affected. We clearly notice how the time factor seems to be 
much more important for some categories of immigrants than for others. For the solid line, we 
calculated predicted values for a hypothetical immigrant from a high-corruption country (CPI = 
0.9), while the dashed line depicts the situation for a hypothetical immigrant from a more Swe-
den-like country (CPI = 0.1). Although no other parameter is allowed to vary, the differences 
are obvious. The positive effects of experiences of corruption are observed among immigrants 
with a relatively short length of residence (reading the graph vertically, at a point closer to zero 
on the x-axis). Simultaneously, we notice that the dashed line is considerably flatter, due to the 
interaction between previous corruption experiences and time spent in Sweden. Hence, the time-Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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related decrease in political trust is much more significant for immigrants in Sweden coming 
from corrupt regimes. At first, they may regard the political institutions in their new country as 
admirably trustworthy (in comparison with other immigrants as well as with native Swedes; 
note that the dotted line in the graph represents the mean political trust level in the latter catego-
ry). Over time, though, they seem to reconsider their initially bright view, ending up with con-
siderably more moderate, and—as suggested by the graph—more host-country typical, levels of 
political trust. 
 
Returning to the estimations reported in Table 1, Model 4 represents a test of our second hy-
pothesis, according to which political trust decreases over time as a result of experiences of dis-
crimination. In line with reasonable expectations, discrimination has in itself a negative and sig-
nificant effect on political trust. Immigrants who report being victims of discriminatory behav-
iour of some kind tend to have less confidence in Swedish political institutions. In contrast to 
H2, however, the inclusion of this variable does not reduce the interaction effect of corruption 
experiences and length of residence at all. Thus, although experiencing discrimination is associ-
ated with lower levels of political trust, inter-category variation in this respect does not explain 




   
                                                 
11 Further analyses (not shown) prove the reason, in analytical model terms, to be that the interaction ef-
fect of corruption experiences and length of residence on discrimination is too weak (interaction effect is 
very close to 0 and not statistically significant). We have also undertaken analyses with a discrimination 
index variable based on items only referring to perceived discrimination in relation to government institu-
tions (i.e. disregarding other public or economic spheres). The results tend to be very similar to those re-
ported here.  Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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Table 2. Predicting political trust by corruption experience (CPI) and years in Sweden, control-
ling for satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy (OLS regression)  
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
     


































Satisfaction with democracy     0.339*** 
(0.035) 
 





































     
   R
2  0.146  0.378 
   N (weighted cases)  516  516 
 
Statistical significance:  *** p < 0.01   ** p < 0.05  * p <  0.10 
 
Note: See note to Table 1.  
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Next, we put H2 through a somewhat more generous test. In this case, we consider the possibil-
ity that an attitudinal change related to discrimination does not necessarily have to involve one’s 
own experiences. It may suffice that one observes people similar to oneself (such as other im-
migrants from the same country, or even from the same part of the world) being treated worse 
than others, and/or having fewer possibilities to affect their situation as well as societal condi-
tions (cf. Maxwell, 2010b, p.91). In Model 1 of Table 2, we therefore consider also variations in 
terms of internal political efficacy, i.e. the extent to which one beliefs that people like oneself 
could have a say in politics.
12 However, even though this variable (quite reasonably) has a posi-
tive and significant effect on political trust, it does not have any impact at all on the interaction 
effect of corruption experiences and length of residence. Thus, the more extensive test of H2 
does not lend it any empirical support either. 
 
True, the measuring of experiences of discrimination of course has its difficulties. It is not hard 
to imagine that a specific type of situation may be interpreted as an experience of “being badly 
treated because of one’s foreign background” by one individual but not by another. Still, we 
contend that the measure used here is rather ambitious, specifying no less than 12 different con-
texts/situations in which discrimination may occur. Respondents were in this case assisted in 
picturing a somewhat clearer image of what a discriminatory situation may be (at least in com-
parison with a general question on experiences of discrimination). Hence, we believe that the re-
sults are credible, and that the lack of support for H2 is not due to a methodological flaw. The 
decrease in political trust among immigrants from countries marked by high corruption does not 
seem possible to explain by experiences of discrimination in Sweden.  
 
The obvious follow-up question is what may then explain the decrease in trust? Case studies, 
focusing on Latino immigrants in the USA and Muslim immigrants in the UK, suggest that im-
migrants are often very positive towards their new political institutions, not least due to the 
“psychological investment” mentioned above (Waters, 1999; Michelson, 2003; Escobar, 2006; 
Maxwell, 2010b). Over time though, they become more sensitive to experiences and perceptions 
                                                 
12 Internal political efficacy is analysed with an additive index based on three interview questions con-
cerning the possibilities (1) to make one’s opinions known to politicians, (2) to make politicians take ac-
count of one’s opinions, and (3) to obtain redress if one is treated wrongly by an authority. For all three 
questions, respondents were asked to indicate their opinions using a scale from 0 (“much smaller oppor-
tunity than others”) to 10 (“much greater opportunity than others”). We imputed missing values by as-
signing a value if a respondent answered at least two of the three questions. The final index variable is re-
scaled to run from 0–1 (higher values indicating a higher sense of internal political efficacy). Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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of how institutions work in practice, resulting in less optimism and, eventually, in a decline of 
political trust. As we concluded this is not driven by experiences of discrimination, at least not 
in Sweden, the pattern must be explained by some other cognitive process.  
 
One possibility is that initially high-trusting immigrants over time start perceiving institutions as 
far from perfect when it comes to their performance in relation to people in general, i.e. native 
Swedes as well as other immigrants. Such an impression may still be based on one’s own expe-
riences, as well as on information obtained from others and from mass media. We try to capture 
possible variations in this respect indirectly, by including two potentially important variables: 
satisfaction with democracy and external political efficacy. Both these variables describe how 
individuals asses the overall possibilities of political influence in a democracy, and their respec-
tive positive associations with political trust have been demonstrated in previous research (e.g. 
Mishler and Rose, 2001; Lawrence, 1997).  
 
Model 2 is augmented with measures of satisfaction with democracy and external political effi-
cacy available in the Swedish Citizen Survey 2003.
13 And we note that the estimation in this 
case indeed reveals a different picture. Simultaneously incorporating satisfaction with democra-
cy and external political efficacy, the interaction effect in focus of this study is drastically re-
duced and no longer statistically significant. Furthermore, expected positive effects are found 
for both newly introduced variables.
14 Substantially, this result tells us that initially high-
trusting immigrants over time tend to be less satisfied (yet not necessarily displeased in an abso-
                                                 
13 Satisfaction with democracy is based on the question “Are you generally very satisfied, fairly satisfied, 
not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Sweden? The original variable 
was recoded into a 4-point scale from 0 (“not at all satisfied”) to 1 (“very satisfied”). External political ef-
ficacy is measured with an additive index based on three interview questions concerning (1) ordinary 
people’s possibilities to present their opinions to politicians, (2) the weight politicians attach to opinions 
presented to them by ordinary people, and (3) the possibilities to obtain redress for someone who has 
been wrongly treated by an authority. For all three questions, respondents indicated their opinions using a 
scale from 0 (“none at all”) to 10 (“very large”). We imputed missing values by assigning a value if a re-
spondent answered at least two of the three questions. The final index variable is rescaled to run from 0–1 
(higher values indicating more efficacy). 
14 Further analyses (not shown) reveal that satisfaction with democracy and external political efficacy 
contribute to roughly the same extent (i.e., the interaction effect would be less reduced and still statistical-
ly significant, should only one of the factors be included). It is also worth mentioning that the interaction 
effect of corruption experience and length of residence is negative and statistically significant, in models 
where satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy respectively are dependent variables (controlling 
for background factors).  Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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lute sense) with Swedish democracy and the responsiveness of the political system.
15 Develop-
ing such more critical standpoints may quite plausibly go hand in hand with diminishing politi-
cal trust. The causal ordering of variables arguably remains an open question given the cross-
section data at hand. But still, our results confirm that the recently introduced explanatory vari-
ables, satisfaction with democracy and external political efficacy, perform differently in the 
analysis in comparison with experiences of discrimination and internal political efficacy.
16  
As an additional analytic control (results not shown), we also examined the results reported in 
Table 2 by means of multi-level modelling techniques. Fitting a random intercept model, in 
which country of origin was specified as the level-2 variable (rendering 87 unique contexts, 
with an average representation of 5.6 respondents), essentially provides the same answers as the 
OLS analysis. True, in this additional analysis the interaction effect proved to be significant (p < 
0.10) also in the final model (i.e. corresponding to Model 2 in Table 2). However, it should be 
noted that in this case, the complexity of the survey design (involving unequal sampling proba-
bilities for different categories of immigrant respondents) is not taken into account. 
 
The quite sensible results notwithstanding, causal effects in both directions seem likely. To be 
fair, in absence of panel data it is hardly possible to draw firm conclusions on the relationships 
between the suggested mechanisms and political trust. It may very well be that external efficacy 
and satisfaction with democracy partly explain the time-related reduction in political trust 
among certain groups of immigrants, but perhaps not to the extent suggested by Table 2. Yet, in 
an extensive series of further estimations, we examined the impact of the following set of poten-
tially confounding factors: various indicators of socioeconomic status at the time of the inter-
view, political interest, political discussion, political knowledge, party identification, political 
preferences (left vs. right), civic virtues, social trust, involvement in voluntary associations, tol-
erance, political recruitment, civic skills, Swedish language skills, media consumption, citizen-
ship (Swedish vs. non-Swedish), and reasons for immigration (refugee vs. other reasons).
 We 
                                                 
15 Moreover, in model 2 where satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy are also controlled for, 
the effect of internal efficacy is no longer statistically significant and the effect of discrimination is re-
duced to about half of its size. This result strengthens the conclusion that internal efficacy and discrimina-
tion do not function as causal mechanisms in this context. 
16 Further analyses (not shown) reveal that the overall conclusions are not changed if controls are made 
for which part of the world one has migrated from. In this case, we categorised immigrants into the three 
group of “West” (Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand), “East” (Eastern Europe 
and Russia), and “South” (Africa, Asia, including the Middle East, and Latin America). This trichotomy 
is admittedly crude, but following Myrberg (2007) it is nonetheless theoretically and empirically motivat-
ed, at least in the Swedish context. Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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moreover analysed the effects of various indicators on relations to the welfare state, subjective 
feelings of integration in the Swedish society, and community attachment (on several levels). 
Noteworthy, however, none of these factors contribute to explain the interaction effect in any 
way similar to satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy. Hence, concluding that immi-
grants in Sweden evaluate political institutions on the basis of general, rather than group-
specific, impressions of performance seems reasonable.  
 
Concluding discussion 
A democratic system is hardly considered as legitimate if citizens do not have at least some con-
fidence in their political institutions. Therefore, it is not surprising that inter-country differences 
(or, similarly, time series evaluations of single country differences) have attracted much scholar-
ly attention.  In this paper, however, we have highlighted intra-country differences in political 
trust, by analysing trust levels among immigrants with potentially different institutional experi-
ences. The approach constitutes somewhat of a ‘quasi-experiment’, as international migration 
provides a basis for the comparisons of institutional performance among a large group of resi-
dents. We started out with the assumption that migrants make system level comparisons, based 
on their past and present experiences of the quality of government; while for non-migrants, the 
institutional evaluation is assumed to be purely theoretically derived. 
 
Immigrants in Sweden come from all parts of the world, and hence their expectations concern-
ing the Swedish political system are likely to differ. A possible objection to our theoretical rea-
soning is that attitudes such as political trust are primarily developed early in life as a part of an 
individual’s political socialization, and therefore are resistant to changes in institutional condi-
tions (Bueker, 2005). However, our findings in this study clearly support the opposite view, ac-
cording to which people in this regard are able to “re-learn”. Specifically, the results in this pa-
per suggest that variations in expected system performance are consequential, as immigrants 
from countries more plagued by corruption initially place higher trust in Swedish institutions. 
This, we argue, is because they have a very different system to compare with, unlike either the 
majority population or immigrants from countries with low—and hence more Swedish-like—
levels of corruption.  
 
Further, our results confirmed that an initially bright view of Swedish institutions tend to be less 
bright over time, as immigrants from countries of high corruption develop more critical view-
points of the state of affairs in Sweden. We expected this change to be explained by experiences Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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of discrimination but, surprisingly, the analyses did not provide any support for this hypothesis. 
We put forward an alternative explanation, according to which immigrants’ perceptions of insti-
tutional performance is likely to concern all kinds of people rather than being restricted to pure-
ly subjective, or group-specific, experiences.  Given this line of thought, the former high-
trusting immigrant over time develops the impression that political institutions habitually, alt-
hough impartially, fail to live up to initially high expectations. As a consequence, political trust 
decreases. The data at hand does not permit a full-fledged test of this competing explanation, 
but at the very least we consider the indirect support it has received in this study as a good qual-
ification for further research on how the time-related trust decrease should be explained.  
 
In what may at first seem as a disappointing result, migrants from countries with poorly func-
tioning institutions, or outright authoritarian regimes, tend to become more distrustful with in-
creasing length of residence in Sweden. However, a reduction in levels of political trust does not 
necessarily mean that Utopia has become Dystopia in the eyes of these immigrants. Rather it is 
possible that they, after a number of years in Sweden, develop a more realistic view of govern-
mental authorities and political elites. From a democratic point of view, a certain amount of po-
litical distrust is clearly warranted, and a politically engaged citizenry is probably not the most 
contented one (e.g. de Vreese, 2005). The attitudinal change, observed in this study, would then 
be possible to interpret as a sign of increasing political integration.
17 Such an interpretation may 
also be regarded as defensible in the light of our finding that the decrease in trust does not seem 
to be a consequence of discrimination.  
 
In any case, we hope that our contribution may stimulate further explorations on political trust 
along the routes suggested in this paper. More research should preferably be conducted on how 
perceptions and expectations affect the evaluation of political institutions. Similarly, we encour-
age further development of theories concerning system level comparisons. Moreover, future 
studies should ideally involve more countries, and thus several types of democratic regimes (for 
an effort in this direction, see Strömblad and Adman, 2010). It would be interesting to explore if 
our findings based on the Swedish case are replicable in other parts of Europe, where it is argu-
ably harder to maintain a good reputation for legislative, executive and judicial institutions. 
                                                 
17 Our expectation resemblance a finding in previous research on immigrants in Sweden, where it is con-
cluded that the longer time an immigrant has lived in Sweden the more political active this person is 
(Adman and Strömblad, 2000, p.22–25). For further studies indicating that integration tend to increase 
with time, see Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997; Alba and Nee, 2003.  Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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Studying perceptions of different immigrant groups in different countries, utopian as well as 
dystopian perspectives on political trust may be more carefully scrutinized.    Institutet för Framtidsstudier/Institute for Futures Studies 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics  
 











Years in Sweden   23.79  14.54  2.23  60.08 
CPI × Years in Sweden  7.72  6.10  0.44  40.11 
Discrimination 
 
0.20  0.40  0.00  1.00 
Internal efficacy  0.47  0.18  0.00  1.00 
Satisfaction with democracy   0.69  0.22  0.00  1.00 
External efficacy  0.48  0.20  0.00  1.00 
Female  0.54  0.50  0  1 
Age 
 
50.36  14.05  21 
 
81 
Education  11.66  3.78  0  25 
 
Note: The sample is weighted to be representative of foreign born people living in Sweden. The figures 
refer only to those who were 15 years or older upon immigrating to Sweden.  
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